




Role of Corporate Governance in Organization 
 
 




Abstract--Following the great financial infamy in big 
companies, like Enron, World Com, Adelphi, Cisco and …, 
one of the most issues noticed by researchers and suggested 
from investors is Corporate Governance, addressing the 
need for company management control, dividing 
economical unit from its ownership and improving the 
performance of the board of managers, auditors, 
accounting system, internal control, and finally maintaining 
investors and stakeholders’ rights. Using better managers 
in companies results in improvement of their performance, 
leading to stockholders rights too; consequently financial 
yields will be increased and company control will be better 
performed. Corporate Governance importance in the world 
is at some extent that Standard & Poors institute has 
introduced following multiple criteria to measure corporate 
governance status: ownership structure, financial 
stockholders relationships, structure and how- to- act of the 
board of managers, and clearance and disclosure of the 
information. Due to the issue importance, this article will 
define the corporate governance and its conceptual 
framework, types of existed theories, types of the corporate 
governance, and comparing them with each others as well 
as attempting to develop corporate governance. 
Index Terms--Corporate Governance, agency theory, 
transactions cost theory, stockholders theory, organization 
and stewardship theory. 
I. Introduction 
Starting the corporate governance through stocks ownership 
had a significant influence on company’s control methods. 
Jensen and Mackling (1976) suggested the agency theory 
basics and defined the manager and stockholder as agent and 
employer respectively. In their analysis a stockholder is in 
against of a manager. One of the essential hypothesis of the 
agency theory is that employer and agent have opposite 
interests[13]. There for, separation of the governance from 
management resulted in an organizational problem called 
agency. The most original problems deal with agency is the 
contrast between manager and stockholder. Namely, a 
stockholder tries to achieve the highest step of the investment 
value and a manager initially tries to increase his/her own 
wealth. So, it is possible that the manager do not act in line 
with stockholder’s interests [17]. 
Embezzlement and financial corruption of the manager and 
send out the stockholder’s interests fro the company, are some 
fanatic examples of this interests contrast. This agency problem 
shows the need to control companies’ management through 
their own stock holders. Nowadays, the corporate governance 
term is a concept being noticed and developed in the business 
world. Corporate governance is the foundation of the company 
relations with other interested groups. In general statement 
corporate governance is a system to control and supervise the 
company. Such as system determine, control, and divest the 
relations between a company and its stock holders. At small 
level, corporate governance considers achievement to 
company’s goals, and at large level it considers optimal 
devotion of the society interests. Corporate governance 
includes a set of control mechanism in and out of the company 
that suitably adjust stockholders rights at one hands and the 
needs and the options of the board of the managers at the other 
hands. Finally, this mechanism provides a useful guarantee for 
stockholders, financial resources providers as well as other 
stockholders in relation with their interests’ maintenance [3]. 
II. Corporate governance definitions 
Corporate governance has been suggested as one of the most 
important commerce terms of the 21 the century. Analyzing 
the existed literature indicates that there is no definition 
agreed with the corporate governance system. There 
significant differences between the definitions of the 
corporate governance system based on cultural, economical, 
and other conditions of ach country, there for, these 
definitions locate in the range included from in finite views 
to advanced views. Term logically, “Governance” which we 
define it as structure and performance of a company in 
respect with public and private stockholders, is synonym 
with words like, governance, reference, supervision, and 
control, which their nature is accountability of managers to 
owners [2]. 
Youndong Luo writes corporate governance system, is a 
system governing the stock companies, and determining 
frameworks, wage division methods, and responsibilities, 
among different stack holders of the company. It also 
illustrates roles and procedures of deciding about the 
company affairs [5]. 
In finance and accounting literature, corporate governance is 
define as: “the range of control system to maintain and 
increase the interests of the commercial units stockholders 
[12]. In fact, corporate governance is a system which control 
procedures of the companies operating to ensure the 
adaptation of the manager with the stockholders’ interests, 
are directed with. Such a system suggests the relations 
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between different groups in order to determine the 
company’s direction and performance. It also states the roles 
and methods, determining how/ infavor of whom the 
companies are governed .Corporate governance does not deal 
with governing the company performance, but it relates with 
business direction, control and supervision of the managers 
actions, as well as being accountability to all stockholders. 
Generally stated, corporate governance addresses the way of 
governing/controlling the companies, specially role of the 
board of managers in this respect, and it provides a 
framework for an intuitional accountability system. 
Definitions of corporate governance in scientific texts have 
common characteristics, which one is accountability. These 
definitions focus on the accountability to stockholders and 
other stack more advanced definitions show that companies 
are responsible against all the society, future generations, as 
well as natural resources. In this view, corporate governance 
system deals in fact within/ex- organizational barriers, crows, 
and adjustment. Existed for companies, insuring that they 
perform their responsibility toward all the stockholders and 
act in all business settings in a responsive manner. Also, 
logic rational in this view is that stockholders’ in tersest are 
only satisfied through considering all stockholders interests; 
because, companies, being responsible toward all stock 
holder, are of more yield and success in the long term. 
Companies can improve their value- making in long term, 
and this occurs through accomplishing their responsibility 
toward all stockholders, and optimizing their governance 
system in a suitable manner [20]. The studies conducted on 
corporate governance paid special attention to structure and 
performance of the board of managers, auditory committee, 
and other similar boards. 
Organization and Stewardship theory: the other 
characteristic of the definitions is to maintain the minor 
stockholder rights as well as defense from stockholders and 
their rights. Using better managers in companies leads to 
improve the company performance as well as increase the 
stockholders rights. As a result, the company’s financial yield 
will increase and its control will be better done. Legal and 
cultural issues, as well as revelation and changes in capital’s 
market result in development of the corporate governance 
theory. 
III. Conceptual  Framework of Corporate Governance 
All definitions of the corporate governance system follow 
common target, and it in colludes providing control on 
management to perform given duties and maintain 
stockholders’ interests. Generally, these views have been 
resulted in suggesting theories for corporate governance 
system, which they include: 
• Agency theory, which is in due of economical and 
financial issues.  
• Cost theory, which is in due of economics and 
organization theory.  
• Stockholders theory, which in due of a social view 
about corporate governance issue. 
• Organization and Stewardship theory[4]. 
1) Agency theory 
• Cohen et al . v…) states that previous articles on 
accounting, finance, and management have shown different 
views about corporate governance. First view, being 
extensively suggested in accounting and finance, focuses on 
agency theory [11]. Agency theory view on corporate 
governance has been contributed by Michel Jensen et al. 
(1998), supposing properties delegation and using a new 
definition from stock company. The main result of properties 
delegation in companies is separation of the companies 
owners from those who are responsible for daily control of 
companies operations; namely all the persons, having 
interests in an organization such as holder of the company’s 
stocks, staffs, providers, costumers, and those who being in 
flounced by the organization activity[13]. This theory tries to 
convince managers to increase stockholders interests and the 
company profit instead of their own interests. In agency 
theory, owners delegate their companies governance to the 
managers, and since managers do not necessarily decide in 
favor of the owner, this separation will lead to appearance of 
agent problem and moral risk. In this respect, two hypothesis 
were introduced. In first hypothesis, it is stating that there is 
contrast between the manager and the owners, and there is no 
agreement between their action and the main target of the 
companies, being wealth increase; even though this kind of  
perform will be against the stockholders interests. There for, 
managers usually invest on the plans with short term 
interests, and do not pay attention to the company interests, 
or they incline toward the separated incomes leading to 
decrease of stockholders’ welfare and interest value. In 
second hypothesis, it is suggested that owners hear some 
problems in confirming the managers actions. To confirm 
performance of managers, the following methods have been 
provided:  
• Using independent auditor  
• Providing voting right for stockholders in general 
assembly 
• Agency costs 
• Plans and coached contracts [10]. 
In agency theory, corporate governance has been noticed as a 
system and mechanism for controlling behavioral interests of 
the management. From agency theory prospective, 
performing the role of revision should be independence of 
managers. As a result, what is noticed more in this theory is 
independence of management from control and revision role. 
This theory deals with the case that one delegates response 
ability of the deciding about financial resources, or 
performing some services following even contract to another 
person. Former will be called owner (or employer) and the 
latter will be called agent (or executor). The relationship 
between stock holder and manager as well as executive 
manager and the managers of the different department of an 
organization are some examples of agency theory. Those 
problems being appeared from agency theory are: 
• Existence of interests contrast between stockholder and 
manager; it means that the stockholder tries to reach to 
the highest investment value, and the manager tries to 
initially increase his/her own wealth, 
• Inability of stockholder in considering manager’s 
actions/ operations, 
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• Effects of in farmed an in favorable election, 
• Moral risk,  
In the condition of assurance lack to future occurrences, 
a contract between stockholder and manager is 
concluded. In accordance with above cases, agency 
theory will be effective and useful if it follows from 4 
ethical principles” to avoid from damaging others, to 
respect others’ votes, to avoid from Lying and accept 
agreement. Beside above cases one should consider 
following two actions: 
• A suitable contract in which wage rate, company risks, 
as well as manager/stockholders shares from resulted 
profit have been determined. 
• A suitable information/accounting system, providing 
necessary data based on contracts, should selected by 
them. In formation of this system should commonly be 
considerable and invaluable for both parties[1]. 
2) Transaction cost theory 
This theory, which is an inter- course combination of 
economics, laws, and organization, first in the name of 
company behavioral theory was suggested by Cyert and 
March (1963), and become one of basics in industrial 
economic and financial theory [16]. This theory bases on a 
foundation that, making companies so great that they 
substitute with market in resources so great that they 
substitute with market in resources devotion. Indeed, 
companies are so complex and extended that they adjust 
market’s transactions, and direct production in accordance 
with price flexibility of the market. Inside the companies, 
some transactions are removed, and the companies’ managers 
adjust production with those transactions that they prefer 
themselves [9]. Transaction cost theory supposes that people 
often upper realistic, while the agency theory addresses the 
ethical risk and agency costs. Agency theory supposes that 
managers try to achieve diverted incomes, while in 
transaction cost theory, managers arrange themselves 
opportunistically. Other difference is that the unit of analysis 
in agency theory is individual, while in transaction cost 
theory the unit of analysis is transaction. However, both 
theories address one problem: how do convince the manager 
trying to increase company profit and stockholders’ in long 
term rather than reach to own interests? This view focuses on 
managerial control [14]. In comparison with agency theory, 
this view states corporate governance as an inevitable 
variable. In revision, corporate governance has no effect, and 
in management dominant it is clearly a symbolic term. In 
fact, master managers select members of the board of 
managers instead of independent individual from his/her 
friends [15]. Members of the board of managers are as 
passive individual in governance procedure, and they depend 
on the company’s managers for information about industry 
and company .Although, corporate governance is an 
appearently composed to maintain the stockholders’ interests, 
these views are combination of both company management 
and board of managers, and there is no stockholder. In these 
theories, also there are not other stockholder or society[19]. 
3) Stockholders theory 
This theory, being a combination of social and organizational 
theories, begun to develop in 1970th; it is more an extensive 
research, That mixes philosophy, ethics, political theories, 
economics, lows, organizational as well as social sciences 
with each other (wheeler et al). Foundation of this theory is 
that companies become more great, and their influence on the 
society is so deep that is should pay attention/accountability 
to much more sections of the society, having mutual interests 
(except stockholders); in the other words, not only 
stockholders are influenced by the company, but they also 
influence on the companies. They, in the companies, have 
interests rather than stocks. Stakeholders include 
stockholders, staffs, sellers, costumes, debaters, neighbor 
companies, and public restricted to conforming the 
managers’ decisions, trying to satisfy they requiring 
themselves to satisfy all of the stockholders’ right or in other 
words they are responsible against all stockholders, they will 
move successful in long term and the probable of reaching to 
determined goals will be more to them. In fact, this theory 
states the responsibility of the company against these 
members. Also, company’s goal in this theory, wealth or 
value creation for stock holders, are satisfied through 
changing their stocks to goods and services. In stakeholder 
model, the view of agency theory is dominated. In this view, 
management as those individuals who depending on the 
board of managers are investigated to determine certain 
information, and here the role of the board of managers has 
been changed to supervisor. In this view, like agency theory, 
the board of managers a long with other managers arranges 
procedures and strategies of the commercial unit, and its 
focus is generally on defining new products, markets, and 
new technologies, as well as helping to executive 
management and strategic plans. As a result, it should be 
noted that in this view, skill, proficiency, knowledge, and 
ability are external resources[5]. 
4) Organization and Stewardship theory 
This theory includes in estimations and acknowledgments 
that determine how to delegate power, facilities and profit of 
the company between owners, managers, and other 
stockholders via governments. Ownership structure and legal 
frameworks are the most basic and determining factors of the 
corporate governance system. Also, external factors, like, 
rates of investment from in/out side, global economic status, 
stock supply in other countries markets, and in outflow 
investment will affect the corporate governance in a country. 
In this theory, it is stated that managers are good agents in 
the companies. Because they try to improve the company’s 
profits and stockholders’ yields to a high level. Also, 
managers excite with the need to be responsible, and this 
makes their work better[7]. 
IV. Classification of the corporate governance system 
According to the conducted studies, each country’s corporate 
governance system is characteristic, and existed corporate 
governance systemic a country is determined by a number of 
internal factors, such as owner ship, economic status, legal 
system, government policies, and culture. Owner ship 
stricture and legal frameworks are the most basic and 
determining factors of the corporate governance system. 
Also, external factors, like rates of investment from in/out 
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side, global economic status, stock supply in other countries 
markets, and intra boarder investment will affect the 
corporate governance in a country. Maybe, there are 
governance systems in the number of countries having such a 
system in common, however, all of these systems classify in 
two major groups. 
Relational or in- organization system: 
In organization  governance system is a system in which 
confirmed companies of any country are under owner ship of 
a few number of major stockholders; they might be the 
members of founder’s family or a small group of 
stockholders, such as creditor banks, other companies, or 
government. In- organization systems are also called 
relational systems because they have close and common 
relations with the companies and their major stockholders. 
Although, in this model so to the close relations between 
owners and managers there are a litter problems, but because 
of little separation level of the ownership and management 
control, the power is always being abased and minor 
stockholder may not be aware of the company operation. The 
other problem of this system is little clearance and the 
possibility to abuse[4]. 
Ex- organizational system 
In this system, great companies are controlled by the 
managers, and stockholders have no role in company’s 
management, and they only effect on managers’ selection. 
This leads to separation of owner ship from management. As 
being seen in agency theory, there is the problem of heavy 
costs, exposed to the stockholder. Although, in ex-
organizational system, companies are directly controlled by 
managers, they are indirectly under the control of the ex- 
organizational members, including financial institutes and 
individual stockholders. 
Comparing two system: in in- organizational system, 
companies are under owner ship of stockholders; 
stockholders control managers but much of this control is in 
the hands of a small groups of them; separation between 
ownership and management is not occurred, and there for 
agency problems ore rarely seen; ownership focus is on a 
small group of stockholders; and there is wealth transfusing 
process between minor and major stockholders- In the 
companies’ law, legislator will see a strong protection for 
investor, and there is also the possibility of power abusing in 
front of the major stockholders, while, in ex- organizational 
systems, great companies are under the control of managers. 
But in owner ship all stockholders are ex-organizational, here 
there are agency problems, ownership diverse, control is in 
the hands of a great group of stockholders, and the possibility 
of stockholder’s democracy is considered. 
V. Clearance and discloser in the corporate governance 
Disclosure issue is an important section in the corporate 
governance. The more clear the internal operation of the 
company and its cash flowing is, and it is reported more 
accurate, the more limited will be the cases of embezzlement 
and bad- management for managers and major stockholders. 
Thus, disclosure rules must be seen as requirements of the 
member ship in bourse market. The important issue about 
disclosure is that all the effective factors on the stock’s price 
should be reported accurately in the correct time. This 
information primarily includes: income list, changing in 
board of managers, properties’ sales and buyer, owner ship 
percent of executive managers, and change in the company’s 
owner ship. Other information being disclosure at next step 
are: the amount of the rewards for board of managers, 
company strategy, and the money circulation under the 
balance sheet. However, clearance is one of the essential 
factors in a corporate governance system. Clearance deals 
with disclosure of facts for all the stockholders. Disclosure 
criticizes the operation of work market hypothesis. Dis 
closure is a different forms of supplying information by the 
company through annual reports of managers’ proceedings, 
investigation of operational and financial states of the 
company, cost and profit list, balance sheet, cash circulation 
list, and the other items. All disclosure cases locate in the 
content of the company risk. 
VI. Corporate governance applying strategies 
The articles, distributed by BAL committee, show that 
essential methods and strategies of applying corporate 
governance are included as:  
1) Recognition of organizational values, traditions, 
performance, and other operational standards, as well as 
a system in which performance adaptation with above 
maintained cases is being guaranteed.  
2) Existence of an integrated organizational strategy, in 
which total success of the organization and individual 
role in that are measures.  
3) Clear appointment of decision makers and important 
persons, leading finally to form a hierarchy that 
facilitates the possibility of executive control by the 
board of manager. 
4) Creating mechanisms that cause interaction and 
cooperation between executive manager, and board of 
managers. 
5) Existence of systems for powerful internal control, 
including internal and independent auditory operation 
in addition to business risk management that acts 
independent from commercial operation.  
6) Certain supervision, on the cases that contrast between 
stake holders interests is considered; Also, knowledge it 
as a risk creating factor. These cases include 
commercial relations between long loanee from banks, 
major stockholders, comer cial management, and other 
in-organizational decision makers. 
7) Developing a managerial and financial rewarding 
system for correct financial management, intermediate 
management, and staffs. This encouragemantes might 
be in the forms of wage increase, improvement or 
intermediates of mental encouragement. 
8) Cleared and facilitated flowing of information in/out of 
the organization. That corporate governance structure in 
different countries has significant variation says the fact 
that there is no way to resolve the problem related with 
corporate governance and structural issues. According 
this fact one can say that correct corporate governance 
could be satisfied regardless of organization’s form. In 
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this respect, it should be considered four important 
forms to control the structure of each organization in 
order to ensure sufficiency of majors controls: 
supervision by board of managers, supervision by those 
who do not involve in operational and daily activities 
(headquarters supervision), line supervision in practice, 
and supervising duties related to risk management and 
independent auditory. In addition to these cases it 
should be ensured that key staffs in business will be 
appointed in appropriate with their abilities and 
qualifications. Other hands, it should be considered that 
government ownership potentially can affect strategies 
and goals of the organization along with internal 
structure of its governance[6]. 
VII. Conclusion 
In this article, after referring to existed definitions about 
corporate governance, we introduce theories related to it: 
1) Agency theory, resulted from economical and 
financial issues. 
2) Transaction cost theory, resulted from economics 
and organizational theory. 
3) Stakeholder theory, resulted from a social view 
about corporate governance, and 
4) Agency and organization theory also, two corporate 
governance systems, 1) relational or in-organizational 
systems, and 2) ex-organizational systems, were 
introduced and compared with each others. After that, the 
strategies for application of corporate governance were 
provided. Finally, while the suggestion to expand 
corporate governance needs to restrict successful and high 
level managers’ privileges, and lead to different 
challenges like economic in efficiency, minute 
management in different levels, and violation of laws of 
the free investment markets [13]; however, such a attempt 
to improve corporate governance is apparent in four 
subjects. First subject involves with organizational 
structure of board of managers; for example, in the case 
of some board of managers we should consider some 
restriction. Second subject is related to auditory commit. 
Third subject includes internal auditors selection by the 
auditory committee of board of managers. Fourth subject 
includes decreasing the differences between master 
managers’ rewards and commercial unit’s staffs. Due to 
carrying out the best procedures instead of legal 
requirements, four above subjects were stated to improve 
corporate governance. At high levels, managers often 
avoid from acceptance of the above suggestions. 
Generally, the need to increase the mechanisms to 
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